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role in the region. Moreover, physical and human capital accumulation are
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1 Introduction
Over the past four decades the growth performance of Africa has been poor com-
pared to that of other developing countries. In particular, the average African per
capita real GDP growth has hardly surpassed two percent, while East Asia and
Pacific countries have been experiencing impressive growth rates in the ranges of
four to eight percent. Moreover, labor productivity did not change significantly
and Sub-Saharan African (SSA) growthwas even negative during the period start-
ing from 1980 to the mid-1990s, whereas the growth of other low income coun-
tries was well above zero in that period.1 This divergence of SSA growth is well
documented as the “African growth tragedy” (see for example Easterly and Levine
(1997)).2
The poor African growth performance is worrisome given that the region needs
to grow at a much higher level in order to meet the target for poverty reduction of
the Millennium Development Goals (see The World Bank (2004)). A natural ques-
tion thus emerges: why has Africa been growing so slowly whereas other regions
have been achieving a sustained and higher level of growth?
This question has driven a large body of studies which broadly agree that
low total factor productivity growth is the main impediment to the poor African
growth performance (see for example Ndulu and O’Connell (1999), Ndulu and
O’Connell (2009), Berthelemy and Söderling (2001), Hoeffler (2002), Fosu (2002),
Tahari et al. (2004)). While this literature has improved our understanding of the
African growth tragedy, it fails to guide us directly to the factors behind the low
productivity growth observed in SSA. The reason is that productivity cannot be
viewed separately from development in technology and efficiency. As such, with-
out a clear knowledge of the factor(s) responsible for low productivity growth,
policy may be ineffective.
This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the African growth perfor-
mance over the period 1970 to 2007. In particular, we use data from Penn World
Tables (PWT) Version 6.3 in the framework of Henderson and Russell (2005) to ex-
amine the contribution of four factors to productivity growth in Africa: changes
1World Bank, World Development Indicators 2008 and African Development Indicators 2008-
2009.
2Note that Barro (1991) was the first to show the divergence of African growth with a statisti-
cally significant negative coefficient on the SSA dummy.
1
in efficiency, changes in technology and physical as well as human capital accu-
mulation. More formally, we seek to address the following questions: What are
the main impediments to economic growth in Africa? What characterizes the few
successful African countries? Do African countries which are members of a mon-
etary union, owing to market size and policy coordination, perform better than
others? Do African countries that have improved macroeconomic management
and institutional quality perform relatively better? Finally, what is the role of the
abundance of natural resources in the African growth performance?
Our paper contributes to the existing literature in four ways. First, instead of
analyzing the Solow residuals, loosely speaking, we decompose the Solow resid-
ual into two components, which may not move in the same direction. We are thus
able to isolate the contribution of technological change from that of efficiency in
explaining the African evolution of productivity.
Second, we allow the technological changes to be non-neutral and analyze all
African economies within a common production technology. This is in contrast
with most of earlier studies that use the standard growth accounting approach
where countries are analyzed separately. One benefit of our method is that we can
better compare African countries and learn from success stories. For instance, our
analysis should indicate whether successful African countries such as Botswana
and Mauritius define the upper level of the African production frontier. More-
over, our findings will indicate which of the four main determinants (physical
and human capital accumulation, technological change and efficiency change) are
the main drivers of growth in successful countries. It will also show us which
factor(s) are the impediments in less successful countries.
Third, we pay special attention to the construction of human capital. In partic-
ular, we estimate human capital similar to that in Hall and Jones (1999). However,
we use more recent and reliable data on school enrollment from Barro and Lee
(2010) together with estimates on returns to education which better suit African
countries (Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004)). Most of the previous literature
considers raw figures on school enrollment as a measure of human capital. While
school enrollment would provide indication on the human capital stock, this mea-
sure does not seem adequate to us in the African context.
Finally, we aim to identify and characterize the winners and the losers over
our observed time period. Thus, we partition Africa according to various criteria
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including geography, institutional framework, democracy, civil war and remote-
ness. In particular, according to geography our grouping comprises North Africa
(NA), SSA and its geographical subdivisions (West, East, South, costal opportu-
nity, landlocked). In the sameway, we use governance and political regime criteria
to define Democracy andAutocracy. Other criteria allow us to consider the groups
of Civil War, resource-rich and CFA countries.3 Our premise is that CFAmembers
that are politically stable and African countries with a democratic regimewill play
an important role in the African growth recovery. On the other hand, we expect
that countries that experienced civil wars and other armed conflicts will perform
poorly.
2 Data
We derive data for 35 African countries from the Penn World Tables (PWT), Ver-
sion 6.3. The number of workers is obtained as RGDPCH * POP/RGDPWOK,
where RGDPCH is per capita GDP computed via the chain method, POP is the
population and RGDPWOK is real GDP per worker. The measure of output is cal-
culated as RGDPWOKmultiplied by the number of workers; the resulting output
is in 2005 international dollars. Real aggregate investment in 2005 international
dollars is computed as RGDPL * POP * KI, where RDGPL is the real GDP com-
puted via the Laspeyres index, and KI is the investment share of real GDP. We
apply the perpetual inventory method (PIM) to the real investment series to con-
struct the physical capital stock. More specifically, the current capital stock is the
sum of the current investment and depreciated capital stock from the previous
period. Following standard practice, we compute the initial capital stock, K0, as
I0=(g+ ), where I0 is the value of the investment series in the first year it is avail-
able, and g is the average geometric growth rate for the investment series between
the first year with available data and 1980 (Caselli and Feyrer (2007)).
For human capital, we employ the Barro and Lee (2010) education data. The
data are available every five years and we linearly extrapolate the data to obtain
3The CFA franc Zone is a monetary Union that includes 14 SSA countries: Benin, Burkina Faso,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon,
Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Togo. The currency of the union was pegged to the
French franc before 1999 and now to the Euro. For details on institutional features on the CFA
zone see Fielding (2005).
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values in between. These education data are an update of widely used previous
compilation of Barro and Lee (2001). Using the improved data, we follow HR
and adopt the Hall and Jones (1999) construction of human capital. However,
instead of using the Psacharopoulos (1994) survey of wage equations to evalu-
ate the returns to education, we use Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) which
provide a more comprehensive study of the returns to education in Africa. Ta-
ble A1 of Psacharopoulos and Patrinos (2004) provides country specific returns
to education for various African economies at different years. To make unified
and general conclusions, we average the returns for each level of education for
the African countries given in their table and apply them to all countries in our
sample to construct our human capital measure. Specifically, let jt represents the
average number of years of education of the adult population in country j at time
t and define labor in efficiency units in country j at time t by
L^jt = HjtLjt = h(jt)Ljt = exp
(jt) Ljt; (1)
where  is a piecewise linear function, with a zero intercept and a slope of 0.266
through the sixth year of education, 0.173 for the next six years, and 0.113 for
education beyond the twelfth year. Clearly, the rate of return to education (where
 is differentiable) is
@ lnh(jt)
@jt
= 0(jt) (2)
and h(0) = 1.
3 Methodology
3.1 Data Envelopment Analysis
We follow themethodology of Henderson and Russell (2005) to construct country-
specific production frontiers and retrieve efficiency scores. More specifically, we
use a nonparametric approach to efficiencymeasurement, Data Envelopment Analy-
sis, which rests on assumptions of free disposability to envelope the data in the
smallest convex cone, the upper boundary of which is the “best-practice” frontier.
The distance from an observation to such cone then presents measure of technical
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efficiency. Data Envelopment Analysis is a data driven approach in the sense that
it allows data to tell where the frontier lies without prior specifying the functional
form of the technology (see Kneip et al. (1998) for a proof of consistency for the
DEA estimator, as well as Kneip et al. (2008) for its limiting distribution).
We specify technology to contain four macroeconomic variables: aggregate
output and three aggregate inputs—labor, physical capital, and human capital.
Let hYit; Kit; Lit; Hiti, t = 1; 2; : : : ; T , i = 1; 2; : : : ; N , represent T observations on
these four variables for each of the N regions. We adopt a standard approach
in the macroeconomic literature and assume that human capital enters the tech-
nology as a multiplicative augmentation of physical labor input, so that our NT
observations are hYit; Kit; L^iti, t = 1; 2; : : : ; T , i = 1; 2; : : : ; N , where L^it = LitHit
is the amount of labor input measured in efficiency units in region i at time t. The
constant returns to scale technology in period t is constructed by using all the data
up to that point in time as
Tt =
8><>:
D
Y; L^;K
E
2 <3+ j Y 
P
t
P
i
ziYi ; L^ 
P
t
P
i
zi L^i ;
K  P
t
P
i
ziKi ; zi  0 8 i; 
9>=>; ; (3)
where zi are the activity levels. Notice that we have two separate summations.
The latter refers to the country while the former refers to time. Here the summa-
tion is over   t. This implies that when calculating the technology in period t,
the previous years technology are also available. That is, it is assumed that tech-
nologies available in previous years were not lost and were at disposal in later
years. Indeed, we believe that it is reasonable to assume that in period t coun-
try i is able to employ the technology that it has been using in previous periods.
That being said, there is no reason to believe it is necessarily efficiently using past
technologies.
The Farrell (output-based) efficiency score for region i at time t is defined by
E(Yit; L^it; Kit) = min
n
 j
D
Yit=; L^it; Kit
E
2 Tt
o
: (4)
This score is the inverse of the maximal proportional amount that output Yit can
be expanded while remaining technologically feasible, given the technology and
input quantities. It is less than or equal to unity and takes the value of unity if and
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only if the it observation is on the period-t production frontier. In our special case
of a scalar output, the output-based efficiency score is simply the ratio of actual to
potential output evaluated at the actual input quantities.
3.2 Quadripartite Decomposition
We again follow the approach of Henderson and Russell (2005) to decompose pro-
ductivity growth into components attributable to (1) changes in efficiency (techno-
logical catch-up), (2) technological change, (3) capital deepening (increases in the
capital-labor ratio), and (4) human capital accumulation. Under constant returns
to scale we can construct the production frontiers in y^  k^ space, where y^ = Y=L^
and k^ = K=L^ are the ratios of output and capital, respectively, to effective la-
bor. Letting b and c stand for the base period and current period respectively, the
potential outputs per efficiency unit of labor in the two periods are defined by
yb(k^b) = y^b=eb and yc(k^c) = y^c=ec, where eb and ec are the values of the efficiency
scores in the respective periods as calculated in Eq. (4) above. Hence,
y^c
y^b
=
ec
eb
 yc(k^c)
yb(k^b)
: (5)
Let ~kc = Kc=(LcHb) denote the ratio of capital to labor measured in efficiency
units under the counterfactual assumption that human capital had not changed
from its base period and ~kb = Kb=(LbHc) the ratio of capital to labor measured
in efficiency units under the counterfactual assumption that human capital were
equal to its current-period level. Then yb(~kc) and yc(~kb) are the potential output per
efficiency unit of labor at ~kc and ~kb using the base-period and current-period tech-
nologies, respectively. By multiplying the numerator and denominator of Eq. (5)
alternatively by yb(k^c)yb(~kc) and yc(k^b)yc(~kb), we obtain two alternative decompo-
sitions of the growth of y^
y^c
y^b
=
ec
eb
 yc(k^c)
yb(k^c)
 yb(
~kc)
yb(k^b)
 yb(k^c)
yb(
~kc)
; (6)
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and
y^c
y^b
=
ec
eb
 yc(k^b)
yb(k^b)
 yc(k^c)
yc(
~kb)
 yc(
~kb)
yc(k^b)
: (7)
The growth of productivity, yt = Yt=Lt, can be decomposed into the growth of
output per efficiency unit of labor and the growth of human capital, as follows:
yc
yb
=
Hc
Hb
 y^c
y^b
: (8)
Combining Eq. (6) and (7) with (8), we obtain
yc
yb
=
ec
eb
 yc(k^c)
yb(k^c)
 yb(
~kc)
yb(k^b)

"
yb(k^c)
yb(
~kc)
 Hc
Hb
#
(9)
 EFF  TECHc KACCb HACCb;
and
yc
yb
=
ec
eb
 yc(k^b)
yb(k^b)
 yc(k^c)
yc(
~kb)

"
yc(
~kb)
yc(k^b)
 Hc
Hb
#
(10)
 EFF  TECHb KACCc HACCc:
Eq. (9) and (10) decompose the growth of labor productivity in the two periods
into changes in efficiency, technology, the capital-labor ratio, and human capital
accumulation. The decomposition in Eq. (6) measures technological change by the
shift in the frontier in the output direction at the current-period capital to effective
labor ratio, whereas the decomposition in Eq. (7) measures technological change
by the shift in the frontier in the output direction at the base-period capital to
effective labor ratio. Similarly, Eq. (9) measures the effect of physical and human
capital accumulation along the base-period frontier, whereas Eq. (10) measures
the effect of physical and human capital accumulation along the current-period
frontier.
These two decompositions do not yield the same results unless the technology
is Hicks neutral. In other words, the decomposition is path dependent. This am-
biguity is resolved by adopting the “Fisher Ideal” decomposition, based on geo-
metric averages of the two measures of the effects of technological change, capital
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deepening and human capital accumulation and obtained mechanically by multi-
plying the numerator and denominator of Eq. (5) by

yb(k^c)yb(
~kc)
1=2 
yc(k^b)yc(
~kb)
1=2
:
yc
yb
= EFF  (TECHb  TECHc)1=2  (KACCb KACCc)1=2  (HACCb HACCc)1=2
 EFF  TECH KACC HACC: (11)
3.3 Distribution Analysis
Our distribution analysis exploits the quadripartite decomposition of the produc-
tivity growth and examines the impact of each of the four components on the
transformation of the productivity distribution over time. By following the idea
of Henderson and Russell (2005) we rewrite the decomposition in Eq. (11) so that
the labor productivity distribution in the current period can be constructed by
consecutively multiplying the labor productivity in the base period by each of the
four components:
yc = (EFF  TECH KACC HACC) yb: (12)
To study the effect of a given component, we isolate its impact by construct-
ing a counterfactual distribution introducing only this component. Accordingly,
the compound effect of two components is isolated by creating a counterfactual
distribution introducing these two components, etc. For example, we investigate
the unique effect of capital deepening on the labor productivity distribution in
the base period assuming no efficiency, technological change, or human capital
accumulation by looking at the distribution of the variable
yK = KACC  yb: (13)
By the same token, assuming further no technological change or human capital ac-
cumulation, we examine the compound effect of capital deepening and efficiency
change on the labor productivity distribution in the base period by constructing
the counterfactual distribution of the variable
yKE = (KACC  EFF  yb) = EFF  yK : (14)
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Assuming further no technological change, we are able to isolate the effect of capi-
tal deepening, efficiency change, and human capital accumulation by focusing on
the counterfactual distribution of the variable
yKEH = (KACC  EFF HACC  yb) = HACC  yKE: (15)
It is evident that multiplying the distribution of yKEH by the effect of technological
change yields the labor productivity distribution in the current period allowing us
to assess the effect of all four components. The choice of the sequence in which
components are introduced in Eq. (13) (15) is arbitrary and depends on the focus
of the analysis on the effect(s) of particular component(s).
4 Empirical Results
4.1 Efficiency Scores
Figure 1 presents observations of African economies in 1970 and 2007, and also
superimposes the production frontiers for 1970 and 2007. The first year in our
sample is 1970 and hence we construct the 1970 frontier using solely these points.
However, for the 2007 frontier, in addition to the data from 2007, we also include
both the inputs and output for each country from 1970-2006. By doing so, we let
countries in 2007 use technologies which were available in each year prior to 2007.
Allowing for this means that the 1970 observations of Algeria, Gabon, Liberia, and
Sudan as well as the 1971 and 1976 observations of Gabon define the frontier in
2007.4
The fact these countries in previous time periods define the 2007 frontier may
sound surprising to some, but to those familiar with African growth, these re-
sults should be expected. For example, consider the case of Gabon which defines
the 2007 frontier in three of its past periods. In the 1960s and 1970s Gabon en-
joyed economic prosperity thanks to its natural resources such as timber (forest
occupies about 85% of the surface), manganese and uranium. Moreover, although
4In order to ensure that countries defining the frontier are not key to our results, we also re-
moved them from the sample and ran the results again. The results remain qualitatively similar
and are available from the authors upon request.
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Gabon initiated oil extraction in 1956, it became important in the 1970s after oil
offshore discoveries and the first oil shocks of that period. In 1975, oil produc-
tion reached a record high of 225000 barrels per day and Gabon joined OPEC. As
such, Gabon’s revenue increased tremendously following the oil price shocks of
the 1970s. Moreover, given the relatively small size of the population (about 1 mil-
lion inhabitants), civil servants in Gabon were among the highest paid in Africa
and this factor fueled consumption.
We should also discuss the case of Algeria. Algeria gained its independence
from France in 1962. The French occupation went back to the 1800s. France put in
place various infrastructures such as roads, railroads, bridges and harbors. They
also modernized the agriculture, industrial, health and education sectors. During
French domination, the settlers also made successful campaigns against diseases
such as malaria (Acemoglu et al. (2001)). As such, it is not surprising that Algeria
had the lowest mortality rate in Africa in the colonial period and Algeria also had
the highest percentage rate of settlers in Africa (Acemoglu et al. (2001)). Given
the precedent, it is not surprising that income per capita was 60 percent higher
in Algeria compared to other NA countries such as Tunisia in 1960 (Chemingui
and El-Said. (2007)). Note that Algeria had large oil and gas revenues and this
may have contributed substantially to defining the frontiers. Algeria is the fourth
largest African oil producer after Nigeria, Angola, and Libya. Moreover, Algeria is
the sixth largest natural gas producer in the world after Russia, the United States,
Canada, Iran, and Norway.
Finally, consider the case of Liberia. The colonial history of Liberia is very
different from other African countries. In particular, while all others have been
colonized by Europeans, Liberia was founded and colonized by American freed
slaves. As such, Liberia has historical ties with the USA. The support and presence
of Americans in Liberia may have induced the settlement of good institutions
and infrastructures and could explain why Liberia may be more efficient than
other countries and defines the frontier in 1970. The country enjoyed political
stability for a long period and was modeled on the American style. This has also
contributed to stable economic growth in the country. The main sources of income
were mining of or iron. Ties links with the USA also encouraged FDI inflows to
the country.
Turning back to the Figure 1, we see that up to a capital per efficiency unit of
labor ratio around 400; 000 (Gabon in 1970), the production frontiers in 1970 and
10
2007 are identical. Starting from this capital to efficient unit of labor ratio, the 2007
frontier shifts upward. In particular, the shift induces a gap between the two fron-
tiers which widens until a capital per efficiency unit of labor ratio value of about
850; 000 (Gabon in 1976) from which the gap starts shrinking until the two fron-
tiers equalize at the highest level of capital ratio of around 2; 000; 000 (Algeria in
1970). This trend in the two frontiers suggest that the main technological changes
occur in countries with a capital per efficient unit of labor ratio in excess of 455520.
Recall that the distance from the frontier (in the output direction) determines
the efficiency of each country. Figure 2 presents distributions of the efficiency
indexes in 1970 and 2007. The data show an important shift of the distribution
away from the frontier between 1970 and 2007. This observation suggests that
African economies have become less efficient between 1970 and 2007. The second
and third columns of Table 1, which give the efficiency scores for each country in
1970 and 2007, confirm this finding. This trend in the distribution of efficiency
in African countries is troublesome because their level of efficiency was already
low in 1970. In particular, the data in Table 1 show that the potential gains from
removing inefficiency in African countries are enormous—up to 44 (69) percent
on average in 1970 (2007). Notice that the mean weighted (by population) aver-
age efficiency index (last row of Table 1) is not very different than its counterpart
unweighted average. This result implies that the (population) size of countries is
not determining their technical efficiencies.
Related to this latter point and as one might expect, the performance of ef-
ficiency is fairly heterogeneous across African countries. However, interesting
results can be derived from averages across predefined groups reported in Table
2.5 For instance, looking at the results across geographical areas shows that NA
is much more efficient than SSA. This result could be explained by fundamental
differences between the two regions. In particular, disease burdens of malaria
and HIV and the exposure to rainfall shocks are among documented constraints
to economic development in SSA (see Gallup et al. (1999) and Artadi and Sala-i
Martin (2003)). Intuitively, diseases reduce returns on FDI and raise transaction
costs on international trade, migration, and tourism. As such, they reduce the op-
portunity to learn from developed countries (Gallup and Sachs (2001)). Moreover,
geographical constraints may affect the choice of economic policy in SSA. Indeed,
in an environment where few firms operate because of high costs, the revenue
5Similar grouping definitions are considered in Collier and O’Connell (2009).
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maximizing tax policy of the government is to impose high taxes on economic
activity which further reduces firms efficiency (see Collier and Gunning (1999)
and Gallup and Sachs (2001)). Finally, agriculture productivity should be lower
in SSA than in NA because the former has a tropical climate while the latter has a
temperate-zone climate (see Bloom and Sachs (1998) and Porter (1995)).
Another difference between the two regions that could explain this gap is the
type of redistributive norm in place in each region. The redistributive norm in
SSA is such that successful individuals have the obligation to share their wealth
with extended family members and others in the community (see Platteau (2000),
Platteau (2009) and Platteau (2010)). There are several possible impacts of such
norms on efficiency and economic development in general (see Platteau (2010) for
a nice exposition). For example, such norms discourage effort because the mar-
ginal productivity of effort is shared amongmany people while the cost of effort is
only taken by one person. Also, such redistributive pressures discourage saving,
investment, entrepreneurship and risk taking because the risk taker will only face
the cost when the project fails, while they will have to share the benefit when the
project succeeds. It also encourages a misallocation of resources. In particular, in
such an environment, a manager is pushed to hire his friends and relatives even if
they do not have the right qualifications. A final example is that these norms en-
courage people to hide their wealth. Using survey data from rural credit Baland
et al. (forthcoming) find excess borrowing behavior in Cameroon. In particular,
they report that more than 20 percent of loans are fully collateralized by liquid
savings of the cooperative members. Moreover, they find that the amount of bor-
rowers’ liquid savings is on average the double of that of the loan they obtained.
This practice is inefficient because the interest rate on credit is much higher than
that on deposit. However, “those interviews indicate that some members system-
atically use credit as a way to pretend that they are too poor to have available
savings. By doing so, they can successfully oppose request for financial help from
friends and relatives”.
Other groupings are also interesting. Consistent with these factors, our re-
sults indicate that landlocked African countries are less efficient than their coastal
counterparts. However, this result is not true in 1970. One explanation why costal
countries were less efficient than their landlocked counterparts could be that the
former was more exposed to the slave trade that weakened the development of
economic activities (see Nunn (2008) for the arguments). However, as we entered
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into the globalization period, the costal countries became relatively more efficient
because of their low cost for trade and FDI. This result is confirmed by sub-period
analysis over four decades between 1970 and 2007 (see our appendices).
Comparing the results across SSA shows that CFA country members are more
efficient than the rest. The fundamental difference between the two groups are
that CFA members have belonged to a monetary union for about half a century.
This framework has imposed monetary and fiscal policy discipline on CFA mem-
bers. As such, these countries enjoyed low levels of inflation and inflation volatil-
ity as compared to others in SSA (see Bleaney and Fielding (2002) and Houssa
(2008)). Another interesting result in Table 2 is that in 1970, resource rich coun-
tries are more efficient, especially the Northern countries. This result is consistent
with our analysis of countries that define the production frontier. In particular,
a large part of FDI inflows to Africa are directed to the natural resource sector.
Therefore, ceteris paribus, countries with abundant natural resources which at-
tract more FDI, may also attract better managerial techniques and would be rela-
tively more efficient.
4.2 Productivity Growth
The third column of numbers in Table 1 presents the growth of labor productiv-
ity. During some thirty years under consideration, labor productivity increased
by 54 percent on average (unweighted). The productivity gains, however, are dis-
tributed unevenly (see Table 1). In particular, Table 2 shows that countries with a
democratic regime, those located in Southern Africa and those in costal areas are
the biggest winners in terms of labor productivity between 1970 and 2007. Within
these groups, we observe an impressive productivity improvement in Botswana,
Mauritius, Malawi, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland. On the other side,
West Africa is the only group for which labor productivity has decreased between
1970 and 2007. This result may capture the adverse effects of drought in Niger and
Senegal. Moreover, the results reflect the low performance of countries that have
experienced political instability, civil wars and other armed conflicts in the region:
Cote d’Ivoire, Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Togo. In general, our results are consis-
tent with the literature that armed conflicts and civil wars destroy and discourage
physical and human capital accumulation, but also lead to the misallocation of
resources (see Baland et al. (2010), Collier (1999), Collier and O’Connell (2009),
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Ngaruko and Nkurunziza (2009), and Imai and Weinstein (2000)). Algeria and
Liberia, two countries that defined the African efficiency frontier in 1970, experi-
enced huge losses in efficiency following political instability in the 1980s and the
civil wars in the 1990s in Liberia and political instability and armed conflicts in
the early 1990s in Algeria. Moreover, the results show physical capital depletion
in these countries in the 1980s and 1990s (see the appendices for decade-wise re-
sults). Similar results hold true for other countries such as Burundi, Rwanda and
Sierra Leone.
4.3 Quadripartite Decomposition
The contributions to changes in efficiency, technological change, capital deepen-
ing, and human capital accumulation are presented in the last four columns of
Table 2. It is clear that physical and human capital accumulation are the factors
that drive productivity growth at the country level. However, given diminish-
ing return to capital, this result may explain why constant growth has not been
sustainable in Africa.
Although most countries are driven by physical and human capital accumula-
tion, some countries have also benefited from technological change. In particular,
apart from Egypt, all NA countries have improved their level of technology be-
tween 1970 and 2007. It is possible that this result reflects the geographical prox-
imity of NA to Europe. Technological catch up also occurred in Southern African
for countries such as Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia, and South Africa.
Efficiency improvements have helped to increase productivity only in Malawi,
Mauritius andMozambique. In all other cases, it impeded the productivity growth
and did so to a large extent. This result suggests that improving efficiency in
Africa is very important to generate sustained growth. In addition, the results
show that Mauritius is the only country that has gained in all four factors during
the 1970-2007 period. This finding is consistent with the widely held view that
Mauritius is a successful African story. This success story deserves particular at-
tention because initial conditions were relatively poor inMauritius. Mauritius has
no mineral resources and sugar cane was the main driver of income through its
independence in 1968. This single good based economy made the country vul-
nerable to terms of trade shocks, but also to rainfall related conditions. In the
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1960s and 1970s, the country also experienced rapid population growth and eth-
nic conflicts. As such, Mauritius had very poor initial economic conditions even
compared to other African nations.6 This finding is also consistent with our esti-
mated efficiency scores in Table 1, showing that Mauritius was less efficient than
the average African country in 1970. These weak initial conditions in Mauritius
led some economists conclude that the country would fail to develop (see Meade
(1961), Meade (1967) and Meade et al. (1961)).
Following the Meade et al. (1961)’s report, the government of Mauritius em-
barked on a number of industrialization policies in the 1960s. The context was
characterized by the Import Substitution Investment (ISI) development strategy.
In this framework, Mauritius initiated the creation of manufacturing firms tar-
geted towards food processing, beverages, cosmetics, fertilizers, footwear, furni-
ture and paints in 1963. These firms were protected against foreign competition
with tariff and import quotas. Moreover, the Mauritian Investment bank was cre-
ated in 1964 in order to ease financing of the newly established firms. In 1968,
Mauritius initiated an Export Processing Zone (EPZ). The key motivation of this
policy was to gain export market access and complement the ISI supported firms
that were only producing for the domestic economy. EPZ is a package of trade lib-
eralization policies aiming to attract FDI and to gain access to the export market.
As such, a number of studies argue that trade openness and FDI inflows have been
the main drivers of growth in Mauritius (see Romer (1992), Sachs et al. (1995) and
Sachs and Warner (1997)). Intuitively, through trade and FDI, the domestic econ-
omy imports better technologies and managerial techniques but also new ideas.
As a result, access to trade and FDI improves technology and efficiency and in
turn becomes more productive.
We should note, however, that EPZ policies did not succeed in other African
countries. For instance, Senegal introduced EPZ in 1974, Liberia in 1975, Cote
d’Ivoire in 1976, Togo in 1977, and the Democratic Republic of Congo in 1978. One
explanation to the success of the EZP program in Mauritius versus the others may
have to do with the different institutional framework and the set of policies that
were implemented in each of these countries. Rodrik (1998) argues that the im-
plementation of a heterodox trade liberalization policy has been the determinant
6Note, however, that Mauritius had initially a better human capital level than other nations in
Africa. In particular, life expectancy was about 60 years in Mauritius in the 1970s compared to
only 42 years for others.
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for the success of EPZ in Mauritius. This heterodox policy involves asymmetric
trade policies across imports and exports. In particular, Mauritius removed taxes
on inputs needed for the development of the export sector. At the same time, the
ISI was still effective on other imported goods. As such, the export sector did not
suffer from anti-export bias of ISI. In addition, Mauritius has had a better macro-
economic environment than other African nations. For instance, Mauritius has
had a relatively lower inflation level. Moreover, and most importantly, exchange
rate policies of the country had delivered undervalued exchange rates such as to
obtain competitiveness to exporting firms (Prasad et al. (2007)). In light of these
considerations, Subramanian (2009) claims that better the institutional framework
has been the main factor behind Mauritius’ EPZ success. Indeed, the Rotberg and
Gisselquist (2009) African index of governance ranks Mauritius with the best per-
formance since 2000. The country has also constantly enjoyed democracy for the
last 40 years. With better governance put in place in Mauritius, there is relatively
limited room for corruption and therefore a relatively better business environ-
ment to attract productive investment.7 It is no surprise that Mauritius is the first
African country to be ranked in the top 20 in the world of the World Bank doing
business report for 2010.
Partially driven by Mauritius, Table 2 shows that countries with a democratic
regime havemuch better performance than any other group.8 In this vein, Botswana
and Malawi also display a strong performance owning to their better institutional
quality (see Acemoglu et al. (2002) and Ndulu and O’Connell (1999)). However,
Botswana has seen a number of challenges such as the development of HIV in the
1990s and rising unemployment.
Finally, note that the international environment has been favorable to the suc-
cess of EPZ in Mauritius. In particular, Mauritius has benefited from preferential
trade treatments from the developed world. For instance, Mauritius has been ex-
empted from protectionism trade policies from the EU and USA. This exemption
was clearly a subsidy to the EZP sector in Mauritius. Such a favorable treatment
may not be available today for other developing countries. Moreover, globaliza-
tion has made export market access today more difficult for developing countries.
7Gyimah-Brempong and de Gyimah-Brempong (2006) recently find that corruption has a larger
detrimental impact in Africa than in other regions of the world.
8We use the Polity IV data whose values range from -10 (autocracy) to +10 (democracy). More-
over, we follow the database and concentrate on two groups of countries: i) democracies with
scores in the ranges +6 to 10; and ii) autocracies and anocracies for others.
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In light of this consideration, Collier (2008) observes that least developing coun-
tries will find it more difficult today to replicate the Mauritian EPZ success. That
being said, EPZ still succeeded in Mauritius while it failed in other SSA countries
that introduced the framework in a similar period to Mauritius. Moreover, Mau-
ritius managed successfully the benefits from EPZ success. For instance, revenues
derived from EPZ have been invested in the service sector which accounts today
for nearly 70 percent of its economy compared to less than 5 percent in the early
1970s.
4.4 Productivity Distributions
The solid and dashed lines in each panel of Figure 3 are the distributions of output
per worker in 1970 and 2007. The figure suggests that the shape of the distribu-
tion has somewhat changed. The ‘poor’ mode has less mass in 2007 which implies
that fewer countries are poor. As the richer countries became even wealthier, the
right tail of the blue dashed distribution stretched to higher levels of output per
worker, providing some evidence for a widening income gap between rich and
poor regions. However, the Li (1996) test provides no evidence that the two dis-
tributions are statistically significantly different from each other. One explanation
may be that there are not enough points in each year to statistically distinguish
the two curves. If this is not the case, then this says that there has been no change
in nearly 40 years. This stagnation is disheartening.
The counterfactual distributions also appear in Figure 3. Panel (a) shows the
isolated effect of physical capital accumulation. Physical capital accumulation, by
itself, has made relatively poorer countries richer and moved the original 1970
output worker distribution closer to that of 2007. Recall that it is poorer countries
that benefited more from capital deepening. Human capital accumulation moved
the output per worker distribution even further to the right (panel (b)), thus mak-
ing each country richer. It should be noted that relatively richer countries got
more from the accumulation of human capital. Panel (c) suggests that efficiency
change has moved the whole distribution leftward, thus eroding the positive ef-
fects of factor accumulation. It is here where African countries should focus their
attention. Finally, the difference between the dotted and dashed curves in panel
(c) is the effect of technological change. Although we have seen that technolog-
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ical change had positive effect for some countries, it does not appear to shift the
distribution at all.
5 Concluding Remarks
Studying growth patterns and determinants of African economies is essential for
understanding what can be done to reduce the gap between the performance of
the continent and the rest of the world. Instead of having the African continent
as a separate group and comparing its average performance to the other regions
in the world, we decide to make a cross-African analysis where we benchmark
African economies against one another. Additionally, in order to draw valid con-
clusions, we employ robust and advancedmethodologies to the most reliable data
we could obtain. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first attempt
to address each of these challenges. First, we gather reliable data on 35 African
economies. Second, we pay special attention to constructing a reliable measure of
the human capital. Third, we apply an advanced methodology. Specifically, we
analyze labor productivity growth by decomposing it into four components at-
tributable to efficiency change, technological change, physical and human capital
accumulation.
We find that physical and human capital accumulation are the factors that
drive productivity growth at the country level for all countries considered. Di-
minishing marginal returns hence partially explain why Africa (as a whole) has
failed to generate sustained growth. Moreover, efficiency losses have constrained
growth in Africa. Examining the outcome in successful countries, such as Mauri-
tius and Botswana, suggests that good governance, institutional quality and good
policies are key factors to improve economic development in Africa. These factors
are even more required in SSA given the natural constraints of geography of the
region.
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Figure 1: Production frontiers in 1970 and 2007
Notes: The bold italic abbreviations show the 1970 observations and the normal font abbreviations show the
2007 observations. The solid line represents the 1970 production frontier and then dotted line presents the
2007 production frontier.
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Figure 3: Counterfactual Distributions of Output per Worker. Sequence of introducing
effects of decomposition: KACC, HACC, and EFF
Notes: In each panel, the solid curve is the actual 1970 distribution and the dashed curve is the actual 2007
distribution. The dotted curves in each panel are the counterfactual distributions isolating, sequentially, the
effects of capital deepening, human capital accumulation, and efficiency change on the 1970 distribution.
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Table 1: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
1970−2007.
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
1 Algeria 1.00 0.25 −14.5 −75.3 4.5 3.6 219.2
2 Benin 0.36 0.24 23.5 −32.9 0.0 22.2 50.7
3 Botswana 0.34 0.34 579.9 −0.1 3.4 143.2 170.8
4 Burundi 0.72 0.19 −23.2 −73.6 0.0 149.0 17.0
5 Cameroon 0.61 0.34 50.6 −44.0 0.0 64.2 63.8
6 Central
African Re-
public
0.37 0.19 −29.4 −47.1 0.0 −11.8 51.1
7 Congo 0.53 0.43 60.7 −19.2 0.0 27.2 56.4
8 Cote d’Ivoire 0.60 0.43 −7.2 −28.2 0.0 −0.9 30.5
9 Egypt 0.55 0.42 164.7 −24.8 0.0 61.2 118.4
10 Gabon 1.00 0.36 1.7 −63.6 0.0 33.8 108.7
11 Gambia 0.60 0.24 2.7 −59.6 0.0 71.1 48.8
12 Ghana 0.19 0.18 20.9 −5.5 0.0 −17.3 54.7
13 Kenya 0.33 0.20 7.5 −40.0 0.0 4.9 70.7
14 Lesotho 0.23 0.15 180.6 −34.0 0.0 261.5 17.7
15 Liberia 1.00 0.08 −78.5 −91.7 0.0 82.8 41.7
16 Malawi 0.17 0.24 134.7 41.9 0.0 5.7 56.5
17 Mali 0.49 0.45 110.7 −8.6 0.0 89.5 21.7
18 Mauritania 0.38 0.24 21.2 −37.7 0.0 42.0 37.0
19 Mauritius 0.40 0.69 214.6 73.7 6.8 22.3 38.7
20 Morocco 0.77 0.39 40.1 −49.3 8.1 32.9 92.2
21 Mozambique 0.65 0.66 89.9 2.0 0.0 80.3 3.2
22 Namibia 0.55 0.33 14.9 −40.1 5.6 12.5 61.3
23 Niger 0.60 0.29 −34.8 −51.3 0.0 15.2 16.2
24 Rwanda 0.79 0.26 −2.8 −67.0 0.0 132.9 26.6
25 Senegal 0.78 0.34 −6.9 −56.8 0.0 59.9 34.7
26 Sierra Leone 0.79 0.41 −25.2 −48.8 0.0 9.5 33.4
27 South Africa 0.64 0.44 29.8 −30.6 5.0 9.3 63.1
28 Sudan 1.00 0.28 89.0 −71.8 4.4 387.1 31.7
29 Swaziland 0.86 0.32 198.3 −62.6 2.1 406.7 54.2
30 Tanzania 0.23 0.15 56.0 −36.6 0.0 91.0 28.7
31 Togo 0.37 0.13 −34.7 −64.8 0.0 5.9 75.0
32 Tunisia 0.63 0.50 139.6 −21.6 7.4 7.8 164.2
(continued on next page)
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Table 1 (Continued)
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
33 Uganda 0.46 0.26 12.4 −42.1 0.0 41.8 36.8
34 Zambia 0.33 0.18 −32.5 −45.4 2.6 −11.8 36.6
35 Zimbabwe 0.41 0.09 −57.9 −78.2 3.7 5.0 77.1
average 0.56 0.31 54.2 −38.2 1.5 66.9 60.3
weighted aver-
age
0.59 0.32 51.5 −38.3 1.8 63.1 69.5
Table 2: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
1970−2007.
Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
North Africaa 0.74 0.39 82.5 −42.7 5.0 26.4 148.5
Sub-Saharan
Africab
0.54 0.29 50.5 −37.6 1.1 72.1 48.9
CFA Membersc 0.57 0.31 8.2 −44.1 0.0 30.9 50.3
Non CFA SSAd 0.53 0.29 67.9 −34.9 1.5 88.9 48.3
WAEMUe 0.53 0.31 8.4 −40.4 0.0 32.0 38.2
CEMAC f 0.66 0.30 7.6 −51.6 0.0 28.8 74.5
Central and East
Africag
0.60 0.27 22.2 −50.5 0.4 92.0 49.2
Southern Africah 0.46 0.34 135.2 −17.3 2.9 93.5 57.9
West africai 0.56 0.28 −0.8 −44.2 0.0 34.5 40.4
Coastal, SSA j 0.46 0.35 39.3 −22.0 1.2 27.7 45.0
Coastal, NAk 0.66 0.40 102.4 −37.0 4.1 47.1 105.3
Landlockedl 0.52 0.25 25.2 −41.4 1.0 85.2 38.5
Resource-rich,
SSAm
0.59 0.34 92.9 −37.3 1.6 39.8 75.9
Resource-rich, NAn 0.82 0.37 62.6 −48.5 5.9 5.7 191.7
Democracyo 0.43 0.45 269.8 11.2 5.3 59.3 90.3
Civil warp 0.75 0.30 5.4 −56.9 2.3 84.9 58.4
a: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia; b: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
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Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zim-
babwe; c: Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, Togo; d : Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; e: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo; f : Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon; g: Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda; h: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe; i: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo; j: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo; k: Egypt, Morocco; l :
Burundi, Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe; m:
Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zambia; n: Algeria, Tunisia;
o: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia; p: Algeria, Burundi, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
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1 Comparison 1970–1979
Capital per efficiency unit of labor
20200 746760 1473320 2199880 2926440 3653000
600
2940
5280
7620
9960
12300
O
ut
pu
t p
er
 e
ffi
cie
nc
y 
un
it 
of
 la
bo
r
DZA
BENWA
BDI
CMR
CAF
COG
CIVEGY
GAB
GMB
GHA
KEN
LSO
LBR
MWI
MLI
MRT
MUS
MAR
MOZ
NAM
NER
RWA
SEN
SLE
ZAF
SDN
SWZ
TZA
TGO
TUN
UGA
ZMB
ZWE
DZA
BEN
BWA
I
CMR
CAF
COG
CIV
EGY
GAB
GMB
GHA
KEN
LSO
LBR
MWI
MLI
MRT
MUS
MAR
MOZ
NAM
NER
RW
SEN
SLE
ZAF
SDN
SWZ
TZA
TGO
TUN
UGA
ZMB
ZWE
Production Frontier in 1970
Production Frontier in 1979
Figure 4: Production frontiers in 1970 and 1979
Notes: The bold italic abbreviations show the 1970 observations and the normal font abbreviations show the
1979 observations. The solid line represents the 1970 production frontier and then dotted line presents the
1979 production frontier.
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Figure 5: Distributions of efficiency index in 1970 and 1979.
Notes: The solid vertical line represents mean of 1970 efficiency distribution and the the dashed curve is the
mean of 1979 efficiency distribution.
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Figure 6: Counterfactual Distributions of Output per Worker. Sequence of introducing
effects of decomposition: KACC, HACC, and EFF
Notes: In each panel, the solid curve is the actual 1970 distribution and the dashed curve is the actual 1979
distribution. The dotted curves in each panel are the counterfactual distributions isolating, sequentially, the
effects of capital deepening, human capital accumulation, and efficiency change on the 1970 distribution.
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Table 3: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
1970−1979.
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
1 Algeria 1.00 0.88 22.3 −12.2 0.0 0.5 38.5
2 Benin 0.36 0.28 4.5 −23.2 0.0 31.4 3.5
3 Botswana 0.34 0.38 148.0 13.1 2.6 81.9 17.5
4 Burundi 0.72 0.38 5.5 −47.0 0.0 93.6 2.9
5 Cameroon 0.61 0.55 59.5 −10.3 0.0 53.5 15.9
6 Central
African Re-
public
0.37 0.35 7.3 −2.9 0.0 2.1 8.3
7 Congo 0.53 0.51 40.3 −4.0 0.0 13.2 29.1
8 Cote d’Ivoire 0.60 0.45 24.8 −25.1 1.0 44.3 14.3
9 Egypt 0.55 0.38 17.5 −31.6 2.3 38.1 21.5
10 Gabon 1.00 0.84 39.2 −16.2 5.0 27.5 23.9
11 Gambia 0.60 0.56 15.6 −7.9 0.0 18.8 5.6
12 Ghana 0.19 0.18 5.4 −4.6 0.0 −3.1 14.1
13 Kenya 0.33 0.29 14.1 −13.9 0.0 12.7 17.6
14 Lesotho 0.23 0.19 50.9 −18.3 0.0 74.8 5.6
15 Liberia 1.00 0.26 −10.8 −74.1 0.0 194.1 17.0
16 Malawi 0.17 0.15 45.2 −11.4 0.0 50.9 8.6
17 Mali 0.49 0.43 23.6 −11.5 0.0 33.9 4.4
18 Mauritania 0.38 0.29 23.2 −22.8 2.0 46.6 6.7
19 Mauritius 0.40 0.45 31.1 12.5 5.9 4.4 5.4
20 Morocco 0.77 0.70 23.8 −10.1 7.5 8.7 17.8
21 Mozambique 0.65 0.56 13.1 −14.4 0.0 31.0 0.8
22 Namibia 0.55 0.45 9.0 −18.6 8.0 7.5 15.4
23 Niger 0.60 0.40 −6.6 −32.1 0.0 35.0 1.9
24 Rwanda 0.79 0.47 −0.1 −41.0 0.0 61.8 4.6
25 Senegal 0.78 0.63 0.5 −18.2 0.0 14.5 7.3
26 Sierra Leone 0.79 0.58 7.6 −27.4 0.0 41.5 4.7
27 South Africa 0.64 0.58 9.9 −8.4 8.6 4.6 5.7
28 Sudan 1.00 0.34 0.7 −66.1 0.0 191.5 2.0
29 Swaziland 0.86 0.35 85.1 −59.0 1.2 268.4 21.2
30 Tanzania 0.23 0.18 13.6 −20.0 0.0 35.0 5.2
31 Togo 0.37 0.21 25.7 −44.5 0.2 65.5 36.4
32 Tunisia 0.63 0.54 27.3 −14.8 4.7 3.6 37.9
(continued on next page)
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Table 3 (Continued)
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
33 Uganda 0.46 0.37 −24.7 −19.2 0.0 −12.7 6.7
34 Zambia 0.33 0.16 −31.8 −50.7 5.1 3.0 27.7
35 Zimbabwe 0.41 0.35 9.3 −15.1 8.6 4.2 13.7
average 0.56 0.42 20.8 −22.0 1.8 45.2 13.4
weighted aver-
age
0.59 0.44 13.9 −22.2 2.2 35.2 13.8
Table 4: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
1970−1979.
Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
North Africaa 0.74 0.62 22.7 −17.2 3.6 12.7 28.9
Sub-Saharan
Africab
0.54 0.39 20.6 −22.6 1.6 49.4 11.4
CFA Membersc 0.57 0.46 19.8 −20.4 0.7 34.2 12.9
Non CFA SSAd 0.53 0.36 20.9 −23.6 1.9 55.6 10.8
WAEMUe 0.53 0.40 12.1 −25.8 0.2 37.5 11.3
CEMAC f 0.66 0.58 35.3 −9.8 1.7 27.7 16.1
Central and East
Africag
0.60 0.43 15.5 −24.1 0.5 47.8 11.6
Southern Africah 0.46 0.36 37.0 −17.0 4.0 53.1 12.2
West africai 0.56 0.39 10.3 −26.5 0.3 47.5 10.5
Coastal, SSA j 0.46 0.38 14.3 −16.0 1.6 24.0 11.0
Coastal, NAk 0.66 0.54 20.7 −20.8 4.9 23.4 19.6
Landlockedl 0.52 0.35 7.5 −25.7 1.1 49.8 6.1
Resource-rich,
SSAm
0.59 0.50 38.8 −16.3 3.0 32.6 19.2
Resource-rich, NAn 0.82 0.71 24.8 −13.5 2.4 2.1 38.2
Democracyo 0.43 0.42 62.7 2.4 5.5 31.2 12.8
Civil warp 0.75 0.50 5.1 −30.4 2.2 56.3 10.4
a: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia; b: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
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Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zim-
babwe; c: Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, Togo; d : Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; e: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo; f : Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon; g: Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda; h: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe; i: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo; j: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo; k: Egypt, Morocco; l :
Burundi, Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe; m:
Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zambia; n: Algeria, Tunisia;
o: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia; p: Algeria, Burundi, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
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2 Comparison 1980–1989
Capital per efficiency unit of labor
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Figure 7: Production frontiers in 1980 and 1989
Notes: The bold italic abbreviations show the 1980 observations and the normal font abbreviations show the
1989 observations. The solid line represents the 1980 production frontier and then dotted line presents the
1989 production frontier.
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Figure 8: Distributions of efficiency index in 1980 and 1989.
Notes: The solid vertical line represents mean of 1980 efficiency distribution and the the dashed curve is the
mean of 1989 efficiency distribution.
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(b) Effect of Human Capital Accumulation
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Figure 9: Counterfactual Distributions of Output per Worker. Sequence of introducing
effects of decomposition: KACC, HACC, and EFF
Notes: In each panel, the solid curve is the actual 1980 distribution and the dashed curve is the actual 1989
distribution. The dotted curves in each panel are the counterfactual distributions isolating, sequentially, the
effects of capital deepening, human capital accumulation, and efficiency change on the 1980 distribution.
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Table 5: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
1980−1989.
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
1 Algeria 0.81 0.49 −8.2 −39.8 0.0 −0.0 52.5
2 Benin 0.29 0.29 9.5 2.9 0.0 −2.2 8.8
3 Botswana 0.39 0.37 73.8 −6.7 0.0 15.0 62.0
4 Burundi 0.35 0.34 14.6 −3.3 0.0 17.6 0.8
5 Cameroon 0.53 0.41 12.7 −23.8 0.0 31.0 13.0
6 Central
African Re-
public
0.34 0.26 −10.5 −22.3 0.0 0.5 14.6
7 Congo 0.48 0.58 59.6 22.2 0.0 17.3 11.3
8 Cote d’Ivoire 0.39 0.55 19.3 42.0 0.0 −20.8 6.0
9 Egypt 0.35 0.37 49.3 4.0 0.0 4.3 37.6
10 Gabon 0.84 0.59 −4.5 −29.1 0.0 0.4 34.2
11 Gambia 0.48 0.40 −0.4 −15.6 0.0 6.0 11.3
12 Ghana 0.17 0.18 1.8 6.7 0.0 −14.3 11.4
13 Kenya 0.28 0.27 4.5 −4.3 0.0 −6.1 16.3
14 Lesotho 0.19 0.16 8.5 −11.6 0.0 18.8 3.4
15 Liberia 0.27 0.22 −23.3 −17.1 0.0 −12.7 6.0
16 Malawi 0.17 0.18 −0.1 7.6 0.0 −12.3 5.9
17 Mali 0.40 0.41 25.1 2.3 0.0 18.5 3.1
18 Mauritania 0.28 0.23 −8.4 −18.7 0.0 0.1 12.6
19 Mauritius 0.40 0.46 33.0 13.3 0.0 1.9 15.2
20 Morocco 0.68 0.56 7.7 −17.0 0.0 0.2 29.5
21 Mozambique 0.56 0.50 −5.7 −10.8 0.0 7.6 −1.8
22 Namibia 0.44 0.37 −4.6 −15.3 0.0 −4.8 18.4
23 Niger 0.33 0.28 −12.1 −15.4 0.0 0.8 3.1
24 Rwanda 0.45 0.33 −6.3 −25.4 0.0 16.5 7.8
25 Senegal 0.59 0.52 −1.0 −11.4 0.0 3.6 7.8
26 Sierra Leone 0.54 0.53 5.8 −2.4 0.0 3.3 4.9
27 South Africa 0.60 0.48 −5.5 −19.9 0.0 −1.5 19.8
28 Sudan 0.31 0.26 −2.4 −17.3 0.0 10.2 7.1
29 Swaziland 0.36 0.37 28.0 4.4 0.0 6.4 15.3
30 Tanzania 0.18 0.13 −11.3 −29.1 0.0 1.3 23.5
31 Togo 0.18 0.15 −23.3 −16.2 0.0 −17.2 10.6
32 Tunisia 0.54 0.49 15.4 −8.9 0.0 0.1 26.6
(continued on next page)
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Table 5 (Continued)
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
33 Uganda 0.37 0.31 −8.8 −15.3 0.0 7.7 0.0
34 Zambia 0.17 0.13 −29.9 −21.5 0.0 −29.6 26.9
35 Zimbabwe 0.35 0.29 −0.1 −17.5 0.0 −2.1 23.8
average 0.40 0.36 5.8 −9.4 0.0 1.9 15.7
weighted aver-
age
0.42 0.36 6.9 −10.9 0.0 1.3 19.9
Table 6: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
1980−1989.
Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
North Africaa 0.59 0.48 16.0 −15.4 0.0 1.1 36.5
Sub-Saharan
Africab
0.38 0.34 4.5 −8.7 0.0 2.0 13.0
CFA Membersc 0.43 0.38 1.7 −7.9 0.0 1.6 11.2
Non CFA SSAd 0.35 0.32 5.6 −9.0 0.0 2.1 13.7
WAEMUe 0.36 0.37 2.9 0.7 0.0 −2.9 6.6
CEMAC f 0.57 0.42 −0.7 −25.1 0.0 10.6 20.6
Central and East
Africag
0.41 0.35 4.8 −14.8 0.0 9.6 12.8
Southern Africah 0.36 0.33 9.7 −7.8 0.0 −0.1 18.9
West africai 0.36 0.34 −0.6 −3.9 0.0 −3.2 7.8
Coastal, SSA j 0.36 0.35 2.1 −2.7 0.0 −4.8 11.8
Coastal, NAk 0.51 0.46 28.5 −6.5 0.0 2.2 33.6
Landlockedl 0.33 0.29 0.7 −10.2 0.0 5.1 7.3
Resource-rich,
SSAm
0.48 0.43 16.1 −10.9 0.0 4.6 24.4
Resource-rich, NAn 0.68 0.49 3.6 −24.4 0.0 0.1 39.5
Democracyo 0.41 0.40 34.1 −2.9 0.0 4.0 31.8
Civil warp 0.48 0.39 −2.9 −16.9 0.0 4.2 13.7
a: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia; b: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
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Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zim-
babwe; c: Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, Togo; d : Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; e: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo; f : Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon; g: Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda; h: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe; i: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo; j: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo; k: Egypt, Morocco; l :
Burundi, Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe; m:
Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zambia; n: Algeria, Tunisia;
o: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia; p: Algeria, Burundi, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
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3 Comparison 1990–1999
Capital per efficiency unit of labor
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Figure 10: Production frontiers in 1990 and 1999
Notes: The bold italic abbreviations show the 1990 observations and the normal font abbreviations show the
1999 observations. The solid line represents the 1990 production frontier and then dotted line presents the
1999 production frontier.
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Figure 11: Distributions of efficiency index in 1990 and 1999.
Notes: The solid vertical line represents mean of 1990 efficiency distribution and the the dashed curve is the
mean of 1999 efficiency distribution.
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(b) Effect of Human Capital Accumulation
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Figure 12: Counterfactual Distributions of Output per Worker. Sequence of introducing
effects of decomposition: KACC, HACC, and EFF
Notes: In each panel, the solid curve is the actual 1990 distribution and the dashed curve is the actual 1999
distribution. The dotted curves in each panel are the counterfactual distributions isolating, sequentially, the
effects of capital deepening, human capital accumulation, and efficiency change on the 1990 distribution.
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Table 7: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
1990−1999.
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
1 Algeria 0.45 0.28 −22.3 −38.8 0.0 −1.0 28.3
2 Benin 0.30 0.27 −2.6 −7.6 0.0 −6.2 12.4
3 Botswana 0.36 0.26 −2.7 −27.4 0.0 9.2 22.8
4 Burundi 0.34 0.23 −21.8 −33.1 0.0 −3.4 21.0
5 Cameroon 0.37 0.34 −13.0 −6.5 0.0 −14.0 8.3
6 Central
African Re-
public
0.24 0.21 −12.3 −15.2 0.0 −5.3 9.1
7 Congo 0.58 0.52 −14.5 −11.1 0.0 −7.5 4.0
8 Cote d’Ivoire 0.54 0.54 −3.5 −1.0 0.0 −8.2 6.1
9 Egypt 0.38 0.44 23.6 14.9 0.0 0.2 7.5
10 Gabon 0.60 0.44 −10.4 −26.6 0.0 −2.9 25.6
11 Gambia 0.38 0.26 −10.1 −31.8 0.0 17.4 12.3
12 Ghana 0.18 0.15 −12.1 −18.7 0.0 −2.3 10.7
13 Kenya 0.27 0.23 −10.8 −14.6 0.0 −5.1 10.2
14 Lesotho 0.16 0.13 24.4 −16.2 0.0 41.8 4.7
15 Liberia 0.08 0.09 −18.8 15.6 0.0 −33.3 5.3
16 Malawi 0.19 0.22 12.8 14.3 0.0 −8.4 7.7
17 Mali 0.39 0.45 31.8 15.5 0.0 11.0 2.9
18 Mauritania 0.22 0.28 5.6 27.4 0.0 −22.6 7.1
19 Mauritius 0.47 0.57 34.5 22.4 0.0 5.8 4.0
20 Morocco 0.55 0.41 −8.7 −25.3 0.0 −0.4 22.8
21 Mozambique 0.48 0.43 −5.4 −9.7 0.0 5.8 −1.0
22 Namibia 0.33 0.32 7.7 −3.4 0.0 −1.3 12.9
23 Niger 0.27 0.30 −3.4 12.2 0.0 −16.7 3.4
24 Rwanda 0.36 0.27 −16.3 −25.8 0.0 −5.1 18.8
25 Senegal 0.51 0.41 −5.5 −19.9 0.0 8.4 8.9
26 Sierra Leone 0.53 0.24 −60.6 −55.0 0.0 −17.2 5.8
27 South Africa 0.46 0.39 −3.6 −15.4 0.0 −1.5 15.7
28 Sudan 0.24 0.30 40.1 26.8 0.0 4.4 5.9
29 Swaziland 0.40 0.34 1.7 −15.1 0.0 4.8 14.4
30 Tanzania 0.12 0.12 13.4 3.7 0.0 2.1 7.2
31 Togo 0.15 0.15 −17.8 −3.0 0.0 −20.5 6.6
32 Tunisia 0.50 0.48 20.3 −3.4 0.0 −0.1 24.6
(continued on next page)
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Table 7 (Continued)
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
33 Uganda 0.32 0.35 48.3 6.5 0.0 39.2 0.0
34 Zambia 0.13 0.13 −24.5 2.6 0.0 −18.6 −9.6
35 Zimbabwe 0.28 0.23 −1.0 −20.1 0.0 4.2 18.9
average 0.35 0.31 −1.1 −8.1 0.0 −1.4 10.4
weighted aver-
age
0.35 0.32 4.4 −4.9 0.0 0.1 10.6
Table 8: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
1990−1999.
Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
North Africaa 0.47 0.40 3.2 −13.2 0.0 −0.3 20.8
Sub-Saharan
Africab
0.33 0.30 −1.6 −7.4 0.0 −1.5 9.1
CFA Membersc 0.37 0.35 −4.1 −5.8 0.0 −6.0 9.3
Non CFA SSAd 0.31 0.28 −0.6 −8.1 0.0 0.4 9.0
WAEMUe 0.36 0.35 −0.1 −0.6 0.0 −5.4 6.7
CEMAC f 0.40 0.33 −11.9 −16.1 0.0 −7.4 14.3
Central and East
Africag
0.34 0.30 0.3 −9.6 0.0 0.2 11.0
Southern Africah 0.33 0.30 4.4 −6.8 0.0 4.2 9.1
West africai 0.32 0.29 −8.8 −6.0 0.0 −8.2 7.4
Coastal, SSA j 0.35 0.33 −1.3 −6.4 0.0 −2.2 8.1
Coastal, NAk 0.47 0.42 7.5 −5.2 0.0 −0.1 15.1
Landlockedl 0.29 0.29 11.8 0.9 0.0 3.1 8.6
Resource-rich,
SSAm
0.41 0.32 −16.9 −18.2 0.0 −7.5 10.0
Resource-rich, NAn 0.48 0.38 −1.0 −21.1 0.0 −0.6 26.5
Democracyo 0.39 0.38 13.2 −2.8 0.0 4.6 13.2
Civil warp 0.37 0.29 −6.4 −15.9 0.0 −0.8 12.9
a: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia; b: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
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Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zim-
babwe; c: Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, Togo; d : Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; e: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo; f : Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon; g: Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda; h: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe; i: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo; j: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo; k: Egypt, Morocco; l :
Burundi, Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe; m:
Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zambia; n: Algeria, Tunisia;
o: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia; p: Algeria, Burundi, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
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4 Comparison 2000–2007
Capital per efficiency unit of labor
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Figure 13: Production frontiers in 2000 and 2007
Notes: The bold italic abbreviations show the 2000 observations and the normal font abbreviations show the
2007 observations. The solid line represents the 2000 production frontier and then dotted line presents the
2007 production frontier.
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Figure 14: Distributions of efficiency index in 2000 and 2007.
Notes: The solid vertical line represents mean of 2000 efficiency distribution and the the dashed curve is the
mean of 2007 efficiency distribution.
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(b) Effect of Human Capital Accumulation
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(c) Effect of Efficiency Change
Figure 15: Counterfactual Distributions of Output per Worker. Sequence of introducing
effects of decomposition: KACC, HACC, and EFF
Notes: In each panel, the solid curve is the actual 2000 distribution and the dashed curve is the actual 2007
distribution. The dotted curves in each panel are the counterfactual distributions isolating, sequentially, the
effects of capital deepening, human capital accumulation, and efficiency change on the 2000 distribution.
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Table 9: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition indexes,
2000−2007.
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
1 Algeria 0.27 0.25 7.4 −7.4 0.0 −0.0 16.0
2 Benin 0.27 0.24 3.1 −11.1 0.0 4.3 11.2
3 Botswana 0.29 0.34 29.9 18.3 0.0 4.3 5.2
4 Burundi 0.22 0.19 −13.2 −15.8 0.0 −3.3 6.5
5 Cameroon 0.34 0.34 5.0 −0.9 0.0 1.5 4.3
6 Central
African Re-
public
0.21 0.19 −6.3 −6.6 0.0 −4.6 5.2
7 Congo 0.53 0.43 −13.7 −18.6 0.0 4.8 1.2
8 Cote d’Ivoire 0.55 0.43 −20.5 −21.3 0.0 −2.3 3.4
9 Egypt 0.44 0.42 13.9 −5.2 0.0 14.6 4.9
10 Gabon 0.40 0.36 −11.4 −9.7 0.0 −6.6 5.1
11 Gambia 0.27 0.24 8.3 −10.5 0.0 11.2 8.9
12 Ghana 0.17 0.18 18.5 8.4 0.0 2.9 6.2
13 Kenya 0.22 0.20 2.7 −7.7 0.0 4.7 6.3
14 Lesotho 0.13 0.15 31.3 17.2 0.0 7.2 4.6
15 Liberia 0.11 0.08 −21.4 −25.5 0.0 −11.6 19.3
16 Malawi 0.21 0.24 23.0 12.7 0.0 −5.7 15.7
17 Mali 0.45 0.45 13.4 −0.5 0.0 7.8 5.8
18 Mauritania 0.28 0.24 7.1 −15.7 0.0 18.8 6.9
19 Mauritius 0.62 0.69 28.1 11.4 0.0 0.3 14.6
20 Morocco 0.40 0.39 14.6 −2.1 0.0 4.1 12.5
21 Mozambique 0.43 0.66 82.0 54.3 0.0 11.1 6.2
22 Namibia 0.32 0.33 10.9 1.7 0.0 4.0 4.8
23 Niger 0.29 0.29 6.7 1.5 0.0 1.4 3.7
24 Rwanda 0.27 0.26 10.2 −4.2 0.0 4.5 10.1
25 Senegal 0.39 0.34 7.1 −14.1 0.0 14.8 8.6
26 Sierra Leone 0.25 0.41 64.9 65.1 0.0 −6.9 7.2
27 South Africa 0.41 0.44 21.2 8.6 0.0 3.2 8.2
28 Sudan 0.32 0.28 42.2 −12.3 0.0 57.1 3.3
29 Swaziland 0.33 0.32 9.0 −3.0 0.0 3.7 8.3
30 Tanzania 0.12 0.15 35.8 16.7 0.0 8.6 7.1
31 Togo 0.15 0.13 −13.5 −11.1 0.0 −8.8 6.8
32 Tunisia 0.47 0.50 23.7 4.5 0.0 0.6 17.7
(continued on next page)
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Table 9 (Continued)
# Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
33 Uganda 0.34 0.26 6.3 −23.2 0.0 37.0 1.0
34 Zambia 0.13 0.18 89.8 38.2 0.0 33.3 3.0
35 Zimbabwe 0.21 0.09 −59.5 −56.6 0.0 −10.8 4.7
average 0.31 0.31 13.0 −0.7 0.0 5.9 7.6
weighted aver-
age
0.33 0.32 16.9 −0.9 0.0 10.7 7.1
Table 10: Efficiency scores and percentage change of quadripartite decomposition in-
dexes, 2000−2007.
Region TEb TEc productivity EFF−1 TECH−1 KACC−1 HACC−1
change × 100 × 100 × 100 × 100
North Africaa 0.40 0.39 14.9 −2.6 0.0 4.8 12.8
Sub-Saharan
Africab
0.30 0.29 12.8 −0.5 0.0 6.0 6.9
CFA Membersc 0.34 0.31 −1.8 −8.2 0.0 0.8 6.0
Non CFA SSAd 0.28 0.29 18.8 2.7 0.0 8.1 7.2
WAEMUe 0.35 0.31 −0.6 −9.4 0.0 2.9 6.6
CEMAC f 0.32 0.30 −4.2 −5.7 0.0 −3.2 4.9
Central and East
Africag
0.30 0.27 5.8 −8.2 0.0 10.4 5.0
Southern Africah 0.31 0.34 26.5 10.3 0.0 5.1 7.5
West africai 0.29 0.28 6.7 −3.2 0.0 2.9 8.0
Coastal, SSA j 0.33 0.35 16.4 3.4 0.0 3.9 7.9
Coastal, NAk 0.42 0.40 14.2 −3.7 0.0 9.3 8.7
Landlockedl 0.28 0.25 1.6 −12.6 0.0 9.8 5.7
Resource-rich,
SSAm
0.32 0.34 25.1 13.4 0.0 4.9 4.4
Resource-rich, NAn 0.37 0.37 15.6 −1.5 0.0 0.3 16.9
Democracyo 0.41 0.45 22.9 10.4 0.0 2.9 8.2
Civil warp 0.29 0.30 14.1 −1.7 0.0 7.7 8.6
a: Algeria, Egypt, Morocco, Tunisia; b: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, Cameroon, Central
African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
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Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Rwanda, Senegal,
Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, Zim-
babwe; c: Benin, Cameroon, Central African Republic, Cote d’Ivoire, Gabon, Mali, Niger,
Senegal, Togo; d : Botswana, Burundi, Congo, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia,
Malawi, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South
Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe; e: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire,
Mali, Niger, Senegal, Togo; f : Cameroon, Central African Republic, Gabon; g: Burundi,
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Gabon, Kenya, Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania,
Uganda; h: Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, South Africa,
Swaziland, Zambia, Zimbabwe; i: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, Liberia, Mali,
Mauritania, Niger, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Togo; j: Benin, Cote d’Ivoire, Ghana, Kenya,
Mauritius, Mozambique, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, Togo; k: Egypt, Morocco; l :
Burundi, Central African Republic, Malawi, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe; m:
Botswana, Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Namibia, Sierra Leone, Zambia; n: Algeria, Tunisia;
o: Botswana, Mauritius, Namibia; p: Algeria, Burundi, Liberia, Morocco, Mozambique,
Rwanda, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Uganda, Zimbabwe.
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